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With this contribution to the “Key Contemporary Thinkers” series from Polity
press, Dermot Moran provides us with a clear, reliable, and sympathetic introduction to
the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. In the “Acknowledgements” with which the text
begins, Moran writes that he wants “to explicate Husserl’s achievement primarily for
those coming to him for the first time…the neophyte” (p. vii) and that he has “tried as far
as possible to present [Husserl’s] project from within, in terms of its own motivations
rather than in comparison and contrast with other philosophers.” (p. vii) He adds that he
does not intend to address Husserl’s critical legacy nor to engage in extensive critique of
his positions. He accomplishes what he sets out to do very well. The writing is clear and
free of jargon. He approaches Husserl’s work charitably, and he avoids engaging in the
many controversies around the interpretation of Husserl’s writings and their broader
significance. This does not mean that Moran refuses to see difficulties and problems with
aspects of Husserl’s thought. He does and he points them out. Moran makes good and
judicious use of the Nachlass (Husserl’s unpublished writings), Husserl’s correspondence,
and the extensive secondary literature on Husserl. He provides a useful bibliography of
Husserl’s published work and the secondary literature. In short, Moran shows himself to
be an excellent guide to the work and life of Edmund Husserl.

The book is structured both chronologically and systematically. The first three
chapters are introductory: a brief but comprehensive introduction, a rich yet concise

biographical chapter, and an overview of Husserl’s conception of philosophy. The next
two chapters are chronological: a chapter on Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891)
and a chapter on what Moran calls the breakthrough to phenomenology, the Logical
Investigations (1900/1901). In the following three chapters Moran addresses Husserl’s
work after 1901 systematically rather than chronologically. There are chapters on (1)
Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology of consciousness, (2) his transcendental
phenomenology, and (3) on the controversial themes of embodiment, otherness, and
intersubjectivity. The final chapter, the conclusion, considers Husserl’s contribution to
philosophy.

The first three chapters lay out some of the difficulties in coming to terms with
Husserl’s philosophy, introduce Husserl’s project and some of its basic concepts
(intentionality) and distinctions (natural/philosophical attitude), and provide some context
for the study with a biography of the philosopher whose life was his work. Yet there is
more to the life than the work. We learn about his friendship with Thomas Masaryk and
his conversion to Christianity. We learn about his family and his students. Brentano is
his most significant teacher. Moran points out the importance of the work of Bolzano
and Lotze, and relatively diminishes the significance of Frege, for the early philosophical
development of the young mathematician Husserl. The biography depicts the young
Husserl’s difficulties in establishing a career, his rise to international repute, and his
disappointment later in life with his failure from his perspective to establish a school of
thought and with the political and intellectual developments in Germany and Europe.
The chapter on Husserl’s conception of philosophy argues, correctly I think, that Husserl

never gave up on the idea of philosophy as a rigorous science. Moran provides us with
an interpretation of the oft cited statement from Husserl’s old age (“Der Traum is
ausgeträumt! [“The dream is over!”]) which understands this as an expression of
Husserl’s disappointment with the turn of events in the political and intellectual life of the
1930’s, i.e., the popularity of the existentialism of Heidegger and Jaspers and the rise of
fascism. Husserl’s dream was a dream of Europe realizing its telos, the life of reason.
This dream he would not see realized.

Moran’s distinction between Husserl’s “eidetic phenomenology” and his
“transcendental phenomenology” is a distinctive feature of Moran’s approach to Husserl.
It is the principle that organizes his systematic approach to Husserlian phenomenology.
Other approaches to Husserl’s phenomenology have organized themselves around the
distinction of realism (Logical Investigations) and idealism (Ideas) or the distinction of
static and genetic phenomenology. According to Moran: “What distinguishes the
transcendental from the eidetic approach is precisely that the eidetic still operates with
‘belief in the world’ (Weltglaube) and has not made the constitution of the world itself a
problem, so is not yet a philosophy of ‘ultimate foundations’ which explicates just how
the phenomenon of world is constituted.”(p. 131) This distinction follows from Husserl’s
distinction of the eidetic and transcendental reductions. Though he never states it
explicitly, Moran sometimes seems to be suggesting that the eidetic approach to
phenomenology is independent of the transcendental approach—something that the
mature Husserl would not accept. In the introduction Moran states that he proposes to
read Husserl “as both phenomenologist and transcendental philosopher.”(p.1) A subtitle

in Chapter 6 reads “From Eidetic Phenomenology to Transcendental Idealism.” It is the
case that Husserl in the Logical Investigations does not present phenomenology as
transcendental philosophy. But, as Moran recognizes, shortly after the publication of the
Logical Investigations, Husserl began to present phenomenology as transcendental and
idealist. He stays with this understanding of phenomenology as transcendental for the
rest of his life. Moran even points out that there are intimations of idealism in the Logical
Investigations. For Moran the transcendental turn is the turn to idealism. His discussion
of the transcendental character of phenomenology is almost solely in terms of idealism.
It would have been useful to point out that this “turn,” if that is what it was, was largely
motivated by the attempt to make sense of the position the speaker of the
phenomenological speech must be in such that the “eidos” is revealed and naturalism and
naïve realism is avoided. Moran does point out that the turn to transcendental philosophy
comes with the “discovery” of the reduction, the epoche. The consideration of the
distinction between the natural attitude and the phenomenological (i.e., philosophical)
leads one to consider the phenomenological to be transcendental. Moran is clear that
Husserl’s transcendental idealism is not a subjective idealism and that it entails what
Moran (and Kant) call “empirical realism.”

In the chapter on eidetic phenomenology Moran discusses, among other things,
intentionality, the noetic-noematic correlation, evidence, temporality, sensation,
perception, and judgment. Husserl was most interested in cognition and judgment, but as
he pursued their constitutive features he became increasingly interested in the prepredicative and the pre-cognitive. Moran comments time and again on the Husserl’s

“Cartesian” approach to consciousness (e.g. p. 143: “his overall Cartesian approach to
consciousness”). Like Descartes, Husserl takes a “voluntarist” approach to
consciousness, that is, mental acts are acts of the will. Further, phenomenology is the
science of what appears to consciousness, yet Moran rightfully points out that Husserl
does not consider consciousness to be as transparent as Cartesianism does. Husserl
acknowledges the significance of emotions, the unconscious, drives, and instincts for the
conscious life, but does not provide much of an account of them. Moran points out
further (p. 148) that Husserl finds there to be a phenomenological distinction between the
ideal life of consciousness and the physical, but, at the same time, Husserl denies that this
entails a metaphysical dualism (which can be found in Descartes). The self, for Husserl,
is a psychophysical unity. Importantly in this chapter, Moran underlines the significance
of the distinction between sensation and perception for Husserl. And he argues that one
of Husserl’s most significant achievements is to show that picture-consciousness is a
specific modality of consciousness, not to be confused with perception. Husserl develops
a critique of representationalism that is profoundly important for Heidegger and much of
subsequent 20th century philosophy.

In the penultimate chapter, “The Ego, Embodiment, Otherness, Intersubjectivity
and the ‘Community of Monads,” Moran takes on a set of questions with which Husserl
quite clearly struggled and about which his efforts have received much criticism. Moran
shows how the concept of the ego developed in Husserl’s work from the Logical
Investigations to his late unpublished speculations. There is much mystification in the
literature about the “transcendental ego.” Moran lets us see how the distinction of the

empirical ego from the transcendental or “pure” ego led Husserl to speculation about a
pre-personal ego, about an “anonymous” ego, about an absolute ego. Moran discusses
the concept of “person” in Husserl’s work and how it arises out of the social. And he
considers the relation of the ego to the body (Ideas II). “The psychic, as Husserl
understands it,” writes Moran, “is not an independent domain, but one dependent on or
‘founded on’ the physical.”(p. 211) Our bodiliness, our embodiment, is central to our
relation to others, our intersubjectivity. Moran notes that “there are considerable
problems with Husserl’s account of the apperception of the other in CM V [Cartesian
Meditations V], and he himself was aware of these problems…”(p. 224) However
problematic Husserl’s treatment of intersubjectivity is, it is the case that for Husserl,
according to Moran, “the objectivity of the transcendent real world outside us is an
achievement of ‘transcendental intersubjectivity.’”(p. 225) He finds evidence of this
Husserl’s writing as early as the 1910/11 lectures. It is, he says, constantly reiterated in
Husserl’s later writings. This chapter concludes with a section entitled, “Husserl’s
Metaphysics of the Ego” in which Moran briefly discusses what he takes to be Husserl’s
metaphysical claims about the ego—claims that are “complex, paradoxical, and deeply
ambiguous.”(p. 231) According to Moran “Husserl tried to develop a systematic account
of the universe as a whole as something with teleological and even theological meaning.”
(p. 231) Moran goes on to say that he believes that Husserl “did take seriously the claim
to have found an absolute source of the world.”(p. 231) He cites Erste Philosophie where
Husserl refers to the transcendental ego as the “bearer of the world.”(Hua 8: 505) Yes,
Husserl considers the ego “absolute” in some sense. But the concept of the “absolute”
does not necessarily take one into theology. Further, though occasionally Husserl writes

about a “system” of transcendental philosophy which he hoped to accomplish (and did
not), this does not amount to a “systematic account of the universe as a whole.”

In the brief final chapter, “Conclusion: Husserl’s Contribution to Philosophy,”
Moran succinctly summarizes Husserl’s accomplishments, raises difficulties, and speaks
to Husserl’s influence. In the space of about 6 pages he raises at least 8 large difficulties
or problems: 1) intuition, 2) perception, 3) evidence, 4) relation of psyche and body, 5)
reduction, 6) metaphysics, 7) paradoxes of temporality, and 8) intersubjectivity. This
pretty much covers the range of Husserl’s thought. For the most part, Moran accuses
Husserl of being “unclear” about these central and basic aspects of his philosophy.
According to Moran, Husserl “seems not to be able to give us a proper philosophical
analysis of the kinds of ‘fullness’ and ‘presence’ that belong to the complete intuition of
an object.”(p. 239) Husserl’s reliance on the concept of “profile” for his account of
perception seems appropriate for sight but not the other senses. Husserl does not
“adequately characterize” what counts as evidence.(p. 240) Although in the earlier
treatment of the question of the relation of consciousness to the body, Moran had
defended Husserl against charges of dualism, here Moran speaks of Husserl’s “dualist
essentialism.” Given that defense, this charge I found to be the most surprising. With
regard to the reduction, Moran claims that the essence of perception after the reduction
turns out to be the same as that before the reduction. Like most readers of Husserl, he is
puzzled about Husserl’s metaphysical commitments, especially since the early Husserl is
clear anti-metaphysical. Husserl’s account of temporality leaves us with various
paradoxes, not the least of which is the concept of the nunc stans which is itself not a

modality of time. Finally, with regard to intersubjectivity, Moran flatly states that “how
egos or monads…relate to one another is a difficult problem that Husserl is not able to
answer. At best he can give detailed description of the structure and nature of this
interrelation and communication.”(p. 243). I find this last sentence revealing. The
language of this last critical section is replete with problems that Husserl could not solve.
Here, not elsewhere in the book, Moran does not seem to remember that, among other
things, Husserl is redefining what philosophy should be. In the first place it is descriptive.
It does not promise to solve all problems nor to resolve all paradoxes. Perhaps a
“detailed description of the structure and nature…” of whatever is all we can
appropriately ask of philosophy. I would agree with Moran that Husserl’s treatment of
many of these basic concepts do leave us with questions. Husserl’s work is certainly
unfinished and, in many respects, puzzling. As Moran recognizes, Husserl himself was
not satisfied with much of his own writing. That is why Husserl began again and again,
why his manuscripts are so repetitive, and why Husserl goes over the same ground time
and again with slightly different vocabulary or from a different starting point.

Moran views Husserl as a philosopher who is “today quite neglected.”(p. 1)
Though this may be so, I think that Moran somewhat understates the significance and
influence of Husserlian phenomenology for 20th century philosophy. This book reminds
us in quite specific ways of the deep debt that subsequent thinkers like Heidegger and
Merleau-Ponty owe to Husserl’s work. Moran considers the re-emergence of an antinaturalistic tradition within analytic philosophy to be an opportunity for revisiting
Husserl with fresh eyes. This too may be so, yet the approach of this book which remains

almost entirely internal to Husserl will not motivate someone coming from that context.
Perhaps it is too much to ask. But showing the reader how Husserlian phenomenology
deals with various philosophical issues in contrast to other approaches might better
motivate a serious reader to pursue a consideration of phenomenology. Having said this,
I should also say that this book is a fine introduction to the philosophy of Husserl. The
only other introduction with which I am familiar is the one by Bernet, Kern, and Marbach.
Their introduction, a good one, is more an overview and summary than it is an
introduction. There are other introductions to phenomenology (Moran is the author of
one) but that is another matter.
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